
The ten-year US Treasury is yielding around 5.1%. We are accustomed to watching this figure primarily to understand what the market expects from inflation, Federal Reserve decisions or economic growth. I believe, however, that it is worth examining it from another angle as well: if a government bond can offer a return of this magnitude today, how much must a risky investment yield in order to remain attractive?
For many years, that question carried relatively little weight. With bond yields at very low levels, investors seeking satisfactory returns were often pushed to increase their exposure to equity markets, corporate credit or investments with expected returns far into the future. The search for yield helped sustain valuations and made financeable projects that, under different conditions, would have warranted closer scrutiny of the capital deployed. Naturally, not everything that was financed during that period was misguided: what was simply different was the price at which the market was willing to make money available.
With a Treasury around 5%, that price once again becomes a significant variable. An investor can pursue part of their return objectives through an asset with very limited credit risk, and ask what additional compensation is required to accept earnings uncertainty, equity market volatility or the default risk of a borrower. This is the opportunity cost of capital: choosing one investment means forgoing the return that another could offer.
The comparison, it should be noted, is not as mechanical as it might appear. The nominal yield on a Treasury does not equate to a guaranteed real return, and anyone who sells before maturity remains exposed to price fluctuations. For a European investor, exchange rates and any currency-hedging costs are additional factors. Above all, a share cannot be compared with a bond by looking solely at the current yield: future earnings growth, shareholder distributions and the multiple the market will be willing to assign to those results all matter.
Yet the shift in relative attractiveness remains. If the government alternative offers higher compensation, risky assets must justify the risk taken with equally compelling prospects. They can do so through growing earnings, solid balance sheets and adequate returns on capital; where those conditions are less apparent, it may be valuations that need to embed a higher risk premium. This does not necessarily mean that the equity market must fall. It means that the standard by which we assess what we buy has become more demanding.
The cost of capital for those raising money
There is a second point that I believe warrants closer attention. The return that an investor requires represents, for those who deploy that capital, a cost. If the opportunity cost for capital providers rises, so too may the cost for the company that needs to raise it, finance a new investment, or refinance existing debt. Projects that are viable when money is cheap may become less attractive when the minimum required return increases — particularly those that absorb resources today while generating cash only many years hence.
Not all companies are equally exposed. Those with ample liquidity, robust cash generation, and long-dated financing may have considerably greater room for manoeuvre than those reliant on new debt issuance. Even in sectors characterised by large capital expenditure programmes, the differentiating factor will increasingly lie in the ability to generate returns on invested capital, not merely in revenue growth prospects. On the credit side, another reflex assumption must be avoided: elevated rates make many forms of financing more burdensome, but do not in themselves indicate that a broad-based deterioration in creditworthiness is under way.
A selective market or a gradual rebalancing: two possible scenarios
We may therefore find ourselves facing a progressively more selective market — both in equity valuations and in borrower quality — while some institutional investors may once again find it attractive to increase their exposure to high-grade fixed income. Alternatively, we may witness a less pronounced rebalancing, in which resilient earnings and economic growth continue to underpin equities and various asset classes attract capital simultaneously. At this stage, we do not have sufficient grounds to elevate the first hypothesis to a conclusion.
Sources
For the Treasury yield referenced: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis – FRED, DGS10 (contextual reading, to be confirmed prior to publication). For the image: Wikimedia Commons, credits above.
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