Advertisement
The platform behind our analysis
Charts, the WPI relative-strength map, seasonality, fundamentals, dark pool and GEX: the tools we use to write The Financial Spectator’s reports.
ChartsWPISeasonalityFundamentalsDark poolGEX
Enter DOMINA ›The free area opens without registration
DOMINA: chart with GEX gamma walls and dark pool bubbles, WPI, seasonality and fundamentals
GEXDark poolChartWPISeasonalityFundamentals
World in Brief 10 days ago ·

The dollar need not lose for China to win

China may not want to replace the dollar, but rather build a system of alternatives that progressively erodes its power. An analysis that goes beyond currency reserves.

Direzione editoriale3 November 2026 · 9 min read
THE FINANCIAL SPECTATOR
Magazine / Geopolitics & Currencies
Global Macro · Analysis
From the yuan to the BRICS, from African infrastructure to Asian trade routes: China's strategy may not be to replace the dollar, but to make it progressively less indispensable.
Author: Editorial BoardDate: 22 October 2026 · draftReading time: 10 min
ChinaYuanBRICSDollarGeopolitics
AudienceINVESTLEARN
Fotografia reale delle infrastrutture e dei container del porto di Yangshan, Shanghai, Cina.
Yangshan Port, Shanghai, China. Photography: Acstar (2013), CC0 1.0 licence, source Wikimedia Commons. Technical adaptation to 16:9 format only, no AI processing. Source and licence.
China may be able to reduce the geopolitical weight of the dollar without replacing it as a reserve currency: financing arrangements, trade supply chains, infrastructure and alternative payment systems can all enhance Beijing's autonomy, without eliminating the central role of American finance.

In his recent article on the yuan and its historical comparison with the Japanese yen, Enrico Gallina highlighted an interesting phenomenon: the Chinese currency is gradually carving out a space in international financing, supported by relatively low interest rates and a bond market that is becoming increasingly accessible to foreign issuers. Enrico correctly observes that this process is insufficient to transform the yuan into a true reserve currency, as fundamental conditions remain absent — including full convertibility, freedom of capital flows and confidence in the rules governing China's financial system.

The contradiction is plain to see. Beijing seeks to internationalise its currency, yet appears unwilling to relinquish the control mechanisms it regards as essential to its economic and political stability. This, however, gives rise to a question I wish to explore further: can we be certain that China's actual objective is to replace the dollar as the primary international currency? Or might we be interpreting China's strategy through a framework that does not necessarily correspond to its true priorities?

The international monetary system is not necessarily unipolar

We are accustomed to thinking of the international monetary system as a succession of hegemonies: first sterling, then the dollar, and perhaps the yuan tomorrow. Yet an international currency performs distinct functions: it finances trade, settles payments, denominates debt and holds the reserves of central banks. There is no certainty whatsoever that these functions must remain concentrated in a single currency.

China may therefore have no need to replace the dollar in order to curtail its power. It may be sufficient for Beijing to build a system in which a growing share of international trade and financing can take place without any mandatory recourse to the American currency.

The issue thus becomes geopolitical before it is even monetary.

The dollar as an instrument of American geopolitical influence

The dollar confers upon the United States an advantage that extends well beyond its role in foreign exchange reserves. Around the American currency there exists an infrastructure of markets, intermediaries, payment systems and financing arrangements that makes its use extremely convenient and, in many cases, difficult to replace. It is precisely this centrality that represents one of the instruments through which Washington exercises its international economic influence.

Beijing appears to be pursuing a different path. Rather than competing directly with the dollar across all its functions, it is helping to develop alternative payment and financing circuits. Cooperation within the BRICS framework is particularly significant: beyond the discussions — often overstated — surrounding a possible common currency, the concrete initiatives relate primarily to the use of national currencies, the interoperability of payment systems and the development of local-currency financing.

We are not facing an already fully formed alternative system, nor do the BRICS constitute a homogeneous bloc under Chinese leadership. But perhaps that is precisely the point. Reducing dependence on the dollar does not require the creation of another dominant currency. It may be sufficient to build alternatives that can be deployed when convenient, or when necessity demands it.

Industrial supply chains and infrastructure financing: the Chinese network

This strategy, however, cannot be read solely through the lens of financial instruments. China commands a growing network of industrial, commercial and infrastructural relationships that may help reinforce its economic influence.

Consider, for example, the role of South-East Asian production supply chains. Countries such as Vietnam have become major international manufacturing platforms, yet they remain significantly dependent on China for components, machinery and intermediate goods. The result is an industrial network in which a substantial share of production destined for Western markets remains linked to the Chinese economy, even when final assembly takes place elsewhere.

Another particularly notable example is Africa, where over the past twenty-five years Chinese lenders have committed approximately $181 billion in loan financing, contributing to the development of infrastructure, transport and energy projects. A presence that has forged lasting economic relationships and, in certain cases, ties of financial dependency. Yet perhaps the most noteworthy aspect is the progressive introduction of the renminbi into infrastructure financing as well, as illustrated by the case of Kenya.

Chinese capital, in essence, does not merely contribute to building infrastructure. It can also facilitate the dissemination of Beijing's monetary and financial instruments.

The military dimension and control of strategic routes

To this dimension must be added the military one. The growth of Chinese naval capability and its increasingly assertive presence in the South China Sea reflect Beijing's determination to exert greater influence over areas that are strategically critical to international trade. The Strait of Malacca is a particularly instructive example: a vital chokepoint for Asian trade flows and energy supplies, but also a strategic vulnerability for China itself.

Beijing does not control this strait, but China's expanding naval power projection capability is contributing to a shift in the region's military balance. This is a matter that extends beyond the control of trade routes and concerns the ability to safeguard one's own economic interests and reduce exposure to pressure from other powers.

The connection with monetary policy is not immediate, but it warrants close attention. A power that occupies central positions in industrial supply chains, finances strategic infrastructure, develops military capabilities and makes available alternative payment systems possesses a diverse and potentially complementary set of tools with which to enhance its international weight.

Naturally, a greater capacity to exert pressure does not automatically translate into the ability to secure consent. Excessive military assertiveness could, in fact, prompt certain countries to reduce their economic dependence on China. This is a significant contradiction, particularly given that the international use of a currency requires trust and predictability.

Implications for financial markets and investors

Returning to financial markets, this evolution could produce significant consequences, though likely very gradual ones. According to the International Monetary Fund, in the second quarter of 2026 the dollar still accounted for 56.70% of global currency reserves, compared with just 2.11% for the renminbi. The gap remains enormous. Nevertheless, the broader use of the Chinese currency in trade payments and financing suggests that internationalisation can advance even without a corresponding increase in official reserves.

For investors, it would therefore be reductive to interpret this process as a simple bet against the dollar. The consequences are more likely to manifest in the progressive transformation of trade flows, in demand for renminbi-denominated financing, in the development of Asian bond markets, and in the growing importance of regional financial infrastructure.

I would not automatically infer from this a decline in demand for US Treasuries, nor a structural weakening of the dollar. Reaching such conclusions would require demonstrating that greater autonomy in payments is also translating into a different allocation of reserves and international capital. This is a possible transition, but far from a foregone conclusion.

A decisive element remains: in times of crisis, the dollar continues to serve as the primary reference for global liquidity. Until that changes, it will be difficult to speak of a genuine superseding of the American monetary order.

And yet, perhaps the change to watch for is not quite that one.

The comparison between the yen and the renminbi proposed by Enrico helps us understand why the Chinese currency does not yet possess the attributes required to compete with the dollar as a reserve currency. But by broadening the analysis to the BRICS, to industrial supply chains, to infrastructure financing, and to Beijing's growing geopolitical weight, a different perspective emerges.

China may have no desire to win the same game the United States won in the last century. It may be seeking, more pragmatically, to modify certain rules of that game — progressively reducing its own dependence, and that of its partners, on the American financial system.

If that is the case, continuing to measure the success of China's strategy solely through the renminbi's share of international reserves would risk causing us to miss the more important shift.

The real question would no longer be when the renminbi will replace the dollar, but how much power the dollar will be able to retain in a world that has an ever-growing number of alternatives.

Editor's Pick

Fundamentals and valuation. The dollar's centrality rests on market liquidity, the depth of the financial system, and institutional trust. The broader use of the renminbi in trade does not, by itself, constitute a credible alternative for global reserves.

Risks and scenarios. The progressive construction of alternative circuits may enhance Beijing's economic autonomy; however, excessive geopolitical assertiveness could deter the very partners China seeks to attract.

What to monitor. The denomination of new international loans, offshore renminbi liquidity, effective utilisation of BRICS payment systems, the evolution of official reserves, and the reallocation of capital into renminbi-denominated assets.

The question is not solely whether the renminbi can replace the dollar, but to what extent a greater plurality of financial instruments can erode the exclusivity of its power.

Sources

  1. IMF — COFER, Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves, Q2 2026. IMF Database.
  2. BRICS — New Delhi Summit Declaration, September 2026 (monetary cooperation and payments).
  3. Boston University Global Development Policy Center — Chinese Loans to Africa Database, 2025 edition.
  4. U.S. Energy Information Administration — World Oil Transit Chokepoints, Strait of Malacca.
  5. Wikimedia Commons — Yangshan Intermodal Container Port, Acstar, licenza CC0 1.0.
THE FINANCIAL SPECTATOR · Magazine · 22 October 2026 · Editorial Board
📡 Follow the Trading Room live sessions
Analyses come to life live on our Telegram channel, from which Trading Room sessions are launched.
Join the Telegram channel →
Newsletter

Don’t miss the next analysis

Subscribe to our free newsletter and get it at the start of every week.